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Abstract. Game theory has been successfully applied in supply chain manage-
ment problems due to its capacity of modeling situations where companies have 
to make strategic decisions about their production planning, inventory control 
and distribution systems. In particular, this article presents the application of 
game theory in inventory management. First, we present the basics concepts of 
non-cooperative and cooperative game theory. Then, we present inventory 
models by means of game theory. For each model, we provide its configuration, 
the solution concept implemented, and the existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium used. 
 
Keywords: inventory control, non-cooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium, 
cooperative game theory, the core, the Shapley value. 
1 Introduction 
This work presents briefly some basic concepts of game theory and shows its applica-
tion in inventory management by using modifications of the classic news vendor 
model. In the traditional news vendor model, the inventory problem is modeled as a 
single decision maker problem (for example, a retailer that wants to define an optimal 
order quantity for a particular product) where the decisions are made without consid-
ering other competitors (for example, other retailers o firms that provide the same o 
similar product in the marketplace), and if there are different types of products, they 
cannot be substituted for each other. The problem with these assumptions is that in 
many real situations this is not true. Now, the question that arises here is: can we con-
struct an inventory model that is able to describe such situations? The answer is YES. 
In particular, we can use Game Theory. 
 
Game theory provides mathematical tools to model strategic interactions in which 
there are several players (decision makers) that want to maximize their benefits by 
playing a certain strategy that considers the strategies of the other players1
1  In inventory problems the strategy is the order quantity 
. The games 
can be divided into two branches: 
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─ Non-Cooperative Games: players are unable to make binding commitments re-
garding which strategy they will choose. Therefore, decisions are made inde-
pendently. 
─ Cooperative Games: groups of players can form coalitions. So they are able to 
make binding commitments with side-payments. 
The following sections show how each of these game theoretic models can be applied 
in inventory problems with several decision makers and substitutable products. The 
definitions used in this work came from Osborne & Rubinstein (1994). 
2 Non-cooperative Games  
This section presents the basic theory behind the non-cooperative model. We start 
giving the formal definition of strategic games. We then continue with the definition 
of Nash equilibrium as solution concept. We focus on the Nash equilibrium because is 
the solution concept most used in the inventory management literature. We end this 
section showing the game setup of the non-cooperative news-vendor model and its 
evolution in the associated literature. 
 
2.1 Strategic Games 
In a strategic game, a decision-maker chooses his action once and simultaneously. 
Formally, 
 
Definition 2.1 A strategic game 𝐺 = 〈𝑁,𝐴𝑖 ,𝑢𝑖〉 consists of  
o 𝑁 = {1, . .𝑛} set of 𝑛 players 
o 𝐴𝑖 = {𝑎1𝑖 , … ,𝑎𝑛𝑖 } set of actions or strategies available to player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 
o 𝐴 =×𝑖∈𝑁 𝐴𝑖 set of action of strategy of the game 𝐺 
o 𝑢𝑖:𝐴 → ℝ the utility function for player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 
Two important observations from the definition 2.1 are 
(a) If player 𝑖 knows 𝐴𝑗, ∀𝑗 ∈  𝑁\{𝑖}, then the game has perfect information. Oth-
erwise, it is a game of incomplete information. 
 
(b) If no two players choose their actions simultaneously, then the game is dynam-
ic. Otherwise, it is a static game. 
The outcome of the strategic game 𝐺  is the profile 𝑎 =  (𝑎𝑖 , . . . ,𝑎𝑛) ∈  𝐴  where 
𝑎𝑖 ∈  𝐴𝑖, 𝑖 ∈  𝑁. This outcome is called pure strategy if the players are not mixing 
their actions. For example, in the case where 𝐴𝑖 is known for everyone, the player 𝑖 
may want to flip a coin to mix his strategy in order to confuse his competitors. 
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In this article we focus on pure strategies of static games of complete information. 
Now, how can we find such strategies? The following subsection is devoted to answer 
the previous question. 
2.2 Solution concepts for Strategic Games 
There are several solution concepts to find a pure strategy of the strategic game 𝐺. 
One of them is the Nash equilibrium which is widely used in non-cooperative games. 
The idea is that the equilibrium occurs if no player wants to deviate because it would 
lead to lower payoff. The formal definition is as follows2
 
: 
Definition 2.2 A Nash equilibrium of a strategy game 𝐺 = 〈𝑁,𝐴𝑖 ,𝑢𝑖〉 is a profile 
𝑎∗  ∈  𝐴 such that for every player 𝑖 ∈  𝑁, 𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖∗,𝑎−𝑖∗ ) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖 ,𝑎−𝑖∗ ),∀𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑖.  
 
Other way to define the Nash equilibrium is by using the notion of the best response, 
 
Definition 2.3 The best response (function) to 𝑎−𝑖  is the strategy that maximizes 
player 𝑖 ’s payoff. Mathematically, 𝐵𝑖(𝑎−𝑖) =  argmax𝑎𝑖  𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖 ,𝑎−𝑖) . Therefore, the 
profile 𝑎∗ ∈  𝐴 is a Nash equilibrium of the game 𝐺 if 𝑎𝑖∗ ∈ 𝐵𝑖(𝑎−𝑖),∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. 
 
Some observations: 
(a) From definition 2.2, Nash equilibrium is a solution to a system of 𝑛 equations 
which implies that the equilibrium may not exist. This is a problem because our 
primary goal is to find the outcomes of the game 𝐺. 
 
(b) From definition 2.3, Nash equilibrium is a solution of a maximization problem 
which implies that the equilibrium may not be unique. The problem with multi-
ple equilibriums is that we do not know which one will prevail in practice.  
 
(c) Note that the definition 2.3 is more useful than 2.2 when we need to compute 
the Nash equilibria. 
The following subsection shows some methodologies to determinate the existence and 
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. 
2.3 Properties of the Nash Equilibrium 
Existence: There are some simple ways to show that at least one Nash equilibria ex-
ists. Since a Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the best response mapping, then the 
fixed point theorem can be used. The theorem is the following,  
 
2  Consider the player 𝑖 ∈  𝑁 =  {1, . . . ,𝑛}. The strategies of the other players 𝑎−𝑖 is given by 
the vector 𝑎−𝑖  =  {𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑖−1, 𝑎𝑖+1, . . . ,𝑎𝑛} 
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Theorem 2.3 If for each 𝑖 ∈  𝑁, 𝐴𝑖 is compact and convex, and 𝑢𝑖 is continuous and 
quasi-concave, then there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the game 𝐺. 
 
Note that sometimes theorem 2.3 is difficult to use. In some situations it is much easi-
er just to verify the concavity of the players payoffs 𝑢𝑖, but we need continuous best 
response functions to do this. 
 
Uniqueness and Multiple equilibriums: It is important to know if a Nash equilibri-
um exists. It is also important to know if only one equilibrium exists because this 
implies that the actions in equilibrium will be observed in practice. However, if we 
have multiple equilibria, then we cannot establish which one will prevail for sure. 
Some ways to show uniqueness are: algebraic argument (looks the optimality condi-
tions), contraction mapping argument (shows that the best response mapping is a con-
traction), univalent mapping argument (verify that the best response function is one-
to-one). 
 
We have defined the basic theory of non-cooperative games so far. Now, we will 
devote the following subsection to describe the competitive new-vendor model as an 
extension of the classic new-vendor model. In this extension, the products are substi-
tutable and hence the players (retailers) compete for the best order quantity to satisfy 
the demand. 
2.4 Application in Inventory Management 
The Competitive News-vendor Model.  
 
Consider the classic news-vendor model. In addition, we have substitution between 
different products sold by different retailers. Also, if a customer does not find a prod-
uct in the first firm, then she may travel to another firm in order to satisfy her demand. 
Hence, each retailers profit depends not only on her own order quantity but also on 
her competitors’ orders. We use the game setup given by Cachon & Netessine (2004), 
• For simplicity, consider two retailers 𝑖 and 𝑗 facing stochastic demands 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 
with c.d.f 𝐹(𝑤𝑖) and 𝐹(𝑤𝑗) correspondingly. 
 
• Firms must choose an inventory level 𝑥𝑖 ∈ [0,∞) at cost 𝑐𝑖 per unit for the perish-
able product that they provide in the marketplace. 
 
• Suppose shortage cost 𝑝𝑖, salvage value 𝑠𝑖. 
 
• This model suppose that the excess demand at firm 𝑖 is satisfies by firm 𝑗. 
 
• The actual demand of firm 𝑗 is 𝑅𝑗 =  𝑤𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑤𝑖 – 𝑥𝑖�+  where 𝛽𝑖 ∈ [0, 1] is the 
substitution rate. 
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• Suppose that the profit of the firm 𝑖 is given by the function 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗). 
 
Given the previous definitions, the expected profit for the firm 𝑗 is defined by 
 
𝐸�𝜋𝑗�𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗�� =  𝑟𝑗  𝐸 𝑚𝑖𝑛�𝑥𝑗  ,𝑅𝑗� + 𝑠𝑗  𝐸�𝑥𝑗 −  𝑅𝑗�+ −  𝑐𝑗𝑥𝑗 −  𝑝𝑗  𝐸�𝑅𝑗 −  𝑥𝑗�+ 
Note that player’s 𝑖  best response (function) is the strategy 𝑥𝑖∗  that maximizes the 
player’s 𝑖 payoff. Following definition 2.3, the best response function is 
 
𝐵𝑖�𝑥𝑗� =  argmax𝑥𝑖𝐸 �𝜋𝑗�𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗�� ,∀ 𝑥𝑗 
Hence, the pair of inventory levels (𝑥𝑖∗, 𝑥𝑗∗) is a Nash equilibrium if 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = argmax𝑥𝑖𝐸 �𝜋𝑗�𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗�� 
𝑥𝑗
∗ = argmax𝑥𝑗𝐸 �𝜋𝑗�𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗�� 
Now, from the classic news-vendor model we know that 
𝑥∗ =  argmax𝑥 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝐹𝑤−1 �𝑟 − 𝑐 + 𝑠𝑟 + 𝑝 − 𝑠� 
Therefore, we can establish that the Nash equilibrium of the competitive news-vendor 
model defined in this work is given by 
𝑥𝑖
∗�𝑥𝑗
∗� = 𝐹𝑅𝑗∗−1 �𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖� 
𝑥𝑗
∗(𝑥𝑖∗) = 𝐹𝑅𝑖∗−1 �𝑟𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 + 𝑠𝑗𝑟𝑗 + 𝑝𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗� 
What about existence and uniqueness in this game?  
It is easy to check that the news-vendors objective function is quasi-concave with 
respect to the order quantity (look second derivative). Hence, there exists equilibrium 
in the competitive news-vendor model.  
Now, the best response mapping is a contraction (see Chinchuluun et al. (2008) for 
more details) because the slopes of the best response functions satisfy �
𝜕𝑥𝑖
∗(𝑥𝑗)
𝜕𝑥𝑗
� < 1. 
Hence, the equilibrium in the competitive news-vendor model is unique. 
 
12º Simposio Argentino de Investigacion Operativa, SIO 2014
43 JAIIO - SIO 2014 - ISSN: 1850-2865 - Página 67
Extensions. 
A brief review of the literature is the following: 
1. Competition in horizontal channels 
 
(a) Nti (1987): inventory model with 𝑛 competitive firms. 
 
(b) Parlar (1988): inventory model with substitutable products. 
 
(c) Lippman & McCardle (1997): competitive newsboy model in both oligopoly 
and duopoly contexts. 
 
(d) Mahajan & van Ryzin (1997): 𝑛-firm inventory competition with dynamic de-
mand. 
 
(e) R. Anupindi & Zemel (2001): decentralized inventory systems with 𝑛 retailers. 
 
2. Competition in vertical channels 
 
(a) Cachon & Netessine (1999): two echelon competitive inventory model with 
one-supplier, one-retailer. 
 
(b) Cachon & Zipkin (1999): two-stage supply chain with fixed transportation 
times. 
 
(c) Cachon (2001): extended the above models to 𝑛 retailers. 
 
(d) H. Wang & Efstathiou (2001): one-suplier and 𝑛-retailers inventory model. 
In the following section, we will present the theory associated with the cooperative 
game model, and then we will show the cooperative new-vendor model. 
3 Cooperative Game Theory 
This section presents the basic theory behind the cooperative model. We start giving 
the formal definition of coalitional games. There are two main issues in this kind of 
models: formation of coalitions, and allocation of the benefits among the members of 
the coalitions. The Core and the Shapley value are solution concepts that help to un-
derstand and solve the issues mentioned before. We end this section showing the 
game setup of the cooperative news-vendor model and its review of literature. 
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3.1 Coalitional Games 
In the cooperative model communication between players is allowed. Hence, the 
players can form coalitions because it may result in higher benefits. The definition is 
 
Definition 3.1 A coalitional game 𝐺 = 〈𝑁,𝑣〉, consists of 
o 𝑁 =  {1, . . . ,𝑛} set of players. 
 
o 𝑣 ∶ 2𝑁 → ℝ  the characteristic function of coalition 𝑆 ⊆  𝑁. 
 
From definition 3.1, the following questions can be pointed out 
(a) How can we know if the coalition 𝑆 is stable? 
 
(b) Given that 𝑣(𝑆) is the worth of the coalition 𝑆, how can we fairly allocate 𝑣(𝑆) 
among the players in 𝑆? 
3.2 Solution concepts for Coalitional Games 
The Core.  
The Core is a solution concept which is used to verify if a coalition 𝑆 is stable. The 
idea is that a coalition is stable if no deviation is profitable. To give a formal defini-
tion of the Core, we first shall define allocation. Let 𝑥𝑖 be the feasible payoff of player 
𝑖. The allocation vector of the game defined in 3.1 is 𝑋 =  (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑁). An allocation 
define how much each player will receive if they play as member of coalition 𝑆. Now 
we are able to establish coalitional stability by means of the allocation vector. 
Definition 3.2 The Core of the cooperative game 𝐺 is the set 
𝐶(𝑣) = �𝑋 ∈ ℝ𝑁:�𝑥𝑖𝑁
𝑖
= 𝑣(𝑁)  and  �𝑥𝑖
𝑖∈𝑆
≥ 𝑣(𝑆),∀𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁� 
 
Suppose that the game 𝐺 has the the allocation vector 𝑋 =  �𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥|𝑁|�. Then we 
can say that the coalitions in game 𝐺 are stable if 𝑋 ∈  𝐶(𝑣). An issue with definition 
3.2 is that it may be empty. In such case, we cannot establish stability for the game 𝐺. 
There several ways to check if the core is nonempty, two of them are the following 
results 
─ 𝐶(𝑣) is nonempty ⇔  𝑣(𝑆) is balanced. 
 
─ If 𝑣(𝑆) is convex, then 𝐶(𝑣) is nonempty. 
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The Shapley Value. 
The Shapley Value is a solution concept to compute fair allocations of the game 𝐺. It 
is defined axiomatically as follows, 
Axiom 1: Symmetries in 𝑣, the value of the players should not change due to permu-
tations of players. 
Axiom 2: Irrelevance of a dummy player, only players generating added value should 
share the benefits. 
Axiom 3: The sum of two games, 𝜋(𝑣1  + 𝑣2,𝑁)  = 𝜋(𝑣1,𝑁) + 𝜋(𝑣2,𝑁). 
The unique allocation that satisfies the previous axioms is the Shapley value 𝜙𝑖(𝑣) 
which is given by the following expression  
𝜙𝑖(𝑣) = � |𝑆|! (|𝑁| − 1 − |𝑆|)!|𝑁|!
𝑆⊆𝑁\{𝑖} �𝑣�𝑆 ∪ {𝑖} − 𝑣(𝑆)�� 
Note that the Shapley Value selects one fair payoff vector 𝑋 = (𝜙1(𝑣), … ,𝜙𝑛(𝑣)) for 
the game 𝐺 defined in 3.1.  
Now, we will devote the following subsection to describe the cooperative new-vendor 
model as an extension of the classic new-vendor model. 
3.3 Application in Inventory Management 
Cooperative News-vendor Model. 
 
The basic assumption in this model is that retailers may increase their profit if they 
decide to cooperate. The basic cooperation rules that could appear in this setting are: 
switch excess inventory to anyone who has excess demand so that the latter can save 
in lost sales cost, or give a joint order and use this quantity to satisfy the total demand 
they are facing so that they can save in ordering cost.  
We use the game setup given by M. Slikker & Wouters (2001), 
• In this model we have 𝑁  retailers facing the stochastic demand 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑖 = {1, . . . , |𝑁|}. 
 
• Suppose wholesale price 𝑐𝑖 and selling price 𝑟𝑖. 
 
• Also suppose a transshipping cost 𝑡𝑖𝑗 per unit from retailer 𝑖 to retailer 𝑗. 
 
• Let 𝑋𝑆be the set of possible order quantity vector of coalition 𝑆 ⊆  𝑁. 
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 • The order quantity vector is given by 𝑥𝑆 ∈ 𝑋𝑆. 
 
• Let 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑆 be the amount of products that are transshipped from retailer 𝑖 to 𝑗. 
By using the previous definitions, we can write the profit of the coalition 𝑆 as follows 
𝜋𝑆(𝑥𝑆) = �𝑟𝑙 min � 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑆
𝑖∈𝑆
, 𝑥𝑙𝑆�
𝑗∈𝑆
−��𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑆 𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑗∈𝑆𝑖∈𝑆
−�𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑆
𝑖∈𝑆
 
Now, we can establish the characteristic function 𝑣 of this game. Given the realized 
demand 𝑤 = �𝑤1, … ,𝑤|𝑁|�, the worth of the coalition 𝑆 is the maximum value of 
𝜋𝑆(𝑥𝑆). That is, 
𝑣(𝑆) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥∈𝑋𝑆
 𝐸𝑤[𝜋𝑆(𝑥)/ 𝑤𝑆] ,∀𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 
M. Slikker & Wouters proved that 
1. There exists coalitions 𝑆 ⊆  𝑁 for this cooperative game 𝐺. 
 
2. There exists 𝑥𝑆 that maximizes 𝐸𝑤[𝜋𝑆(𝑥)/ 𝑤𝑆] 
 
3. The cooperative news-vendor game has a nonempty core. 
Extensions. 
A brief review of the literature is the following. Note that there are a few papers talk-
ing about the application of cooperative game theory in inventory management. 
1. Competition in horizontal channels 
 
(a) Gerchak & Gupta (1991): joint inventory control among 𝑛 retailers and one 
supplier 
 
(b) Hartman & Dror (1996): centralized and continuous-review inventory system 
 
(c) N. Rudi & Pyke (2001): two-location inventory with transshipment. 
 
2. Competition in vertical channels 
 
(a) Raghunathan (2003): one manufacturer, 𝑛-retailer supply chain with correlated 
demand at retailers. 
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4 Final Comments 
In this work we briefly have discussed some basic concepts of both non-cooperative 
and cooperative game theory. Also, we reviewed applications of game theory in some 
extensions of the classic news-vendor model. It is important to point out that there is 
more equilibrium analysis in supply chain management. For example, 
1. Production and Pricing Competition: Vertical competition between a manufac-
turer and a retailer, or horizontal competition between manufacturers or retailers. 
 
2. Capacity decisions: capacity-constrained systems where a supplier provides prod-
ucts to several retailers. 
 
3. Joint inventory decisions: firms order jointly and decide how to allocate the in-
ventory savings. 
 
4. Channel coordination: allocate inventory risk between suppliers and retailers via 
different types of contracts (buy-back, quantity discount, etc). 
It is also important to comment on directions for future research 
1. Inventory Games: More papers focus on decentralized channel. It could be a good 
direction to research on centralized inventory. 
 
2. Multi-stage inventory models: Two examples are, 
 
(a) Retailers make order decision at the first stage. At the second stage, they decide 
how much inventory to transship among locations to better match demand. 
 
(b) Inventory procurement. Then, decide how much inventory to share with others. 
And then, decide how much inventory to transship. 
 
3. Information asymmetry in supply chain contracts: Supplier offers a menu of 
contracts. The idea is that the manufacturer chooses the contract that the supplier 
wants to implement. 
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